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We trust modern medicine to be evidence-based: grounded in the most current and reliable research available. But sometimes medicine gets it wrong, and clinicians engage in unproven, ineffective, expensive, and even harmful practices. Worse, these practices can become entrenched as standard protocols.<\/p>\n
Clinicians are not immune from hope. And hope, bolstered by logic, intuition, and bio-plausibility\u2014the idea that a practice aligns with known science\u2014has occasionally led clinicians to accept new therapies in the honest expectation that they will be proven in time.<\/p>\n
An example was the rush to embrace the use of corticosteroids for spinal cord injuries in the 1990s.<\/p>\n
Approximately 18,000 Americans suffer<\/a> a spinal cord injury each year. Depending upon the nature and location of the injury, patients may incur paraplegia or quadriplegia, injuries with tragic life limiting impacts that we see around us all too often.<\/p>\n A 1990 study<\/a> of patients with acute spinal-cord injury found that those who received the corticosteroid methylprednisolone within eight hours of their injury scored significantly better on measures of motor function and sensation at six weeks and six months post injury than patients receiving a placebo.<\/p>\n Hopeful that subsequent research would support the first study, physicians adopted the use of methylprednisolone after traumatic spinal cord injuries in an attempt to prevent or limit paralysis.<\/p>\n Writing about Christopher Reeve in the New Yorker in 2003, Jerome Groopman, M.D., stated<\/a> without equivocation that the 1990 study had shown \u201cthat a prompt dose of methylprednisolone could limit inflammation and spinal-cord damage.\u201d<\/p>\n Subsequent studies did not bear this out. The MRC CRASH Study<\/a> published in 2005 found \u201cno evidence that the effect of corticosteroids differed by injury severity or time since injury.\u201d<\/p>\n In 2011, the Mayo Clinic posted a video<\/a> citing increased morbidity and \u201cno true demonstrable benefit\u201d from corticosteroids in its decision to remove them from Mayo\u2019s protocols for spinal cord injuries. By 2013, the American Association of Neurological Surgeons\u2019 Guidelines for the Management of Acute Cervical Spine and Spinal Cord Injuries<\/em> recommended against the routine administration of methylprednisolone.<\/p>\n Vinay Prasad, M.D., MPH, and Adam Cifu, M.D., have coined the term \u201cmedical reversal\u201d to describe the \u201cthe phenomenon of a new trial \u2014 superior to predecessors because of better design, increased power, or more appropriate controls \u2014 contradicting current clinical practice.\u201d For Prasad and Cifu, there is an important difference between the \u201cthe natural progression of supplanting old technologies with new ones and reversal in which a regularly used medicine, procedure, or device is identified as being ineffective or even harmful.\u201d<\/p>\n The greatest number of reversals identified<\/a> by Prasad and Cifu were specific to cardiovascular disease. One of the most famous of these concerns the use of percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) or stenting in patients with chronic stable coronary artery disease (CAD).<\/p>\n By the end of the last century, PCI had come to be considered first-line therapy for patients with CAD. The procedure\u2019s benefits and efficacy seemed evidenced by the fact that patients reported reduced angina pain after receiving stents. It was assumed that a procedure which opened a narrowed artery would lead to decreased mortality from heart attack, that improvement in anginal symptoms was a good surrogate for overall benefit.<\/p>\n The Clinical Outcomes Utilizing Revascularization and Aggressive Drug Evaluation study, (also known as the COURAGE Trial<\/a>) study published in New England Journal of Medicine in 2007, showed that PCI in patients with chronic stable CAD did not decrease death rates compared to optimal medical management of atherosclerotic vascular disease. \u00a0While stents were effective at relieving pain caused by blockages in arteries, a heart attack was as likely to result from the rupture of plaque in a less occluded artery.<\/p>\n Remarkably, the COURAGE Trial did not result in a marked reduction in the use of PCI. Rather, there was a continued increase in non-surgical coronary interventions in the years immediately following its publication. Many cardiologists held steadfast in their belief in the value of stents, confident that longer-term studies would support their assumptions.<\/p>\n In fact, subsequent studies supported the COURAGE Trial.<\/p>\n While inappropriate use of stents has declined in light of this mounting evidence, as recently as 2016, data<\/a>from four American College of Cardiology National Cardiovascular Data Registries suggested that up to 50 percent of stent placements in stable patients may have been inappropriate.<\/p>\n Patient demand can drive the continued use of disproven procedures, particularly when there are concurrent financial incentives for providers.<\/p>\n Arthroscopic partial meniscectomy (APM) is one of the most common orthopedic surgeries performed in the United States. \u00a0But even though 750,000<\/a> patients undergo the procedure annually at a cost of up to $10,000, APM has not been shown to be a more effective treatment option than nonoperative approaches.<\/p>\n A study<\/a> published in the NEJM in 2013 found that the outcomes for patients who had standardized physical therapy did not differ significantly from patients who had APM with postoperative physical therapy.<\/p>\n This was supported by a study<\/a> published in JAMA in 2022. Yet, even as recently as 2021 the American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons maintained that APM was appropriate for the treatment of meniscal tears in patients with concomitant mild to moderate osteoarthritis who have failed physical therapy or other non-surgical treatments.<\/p>\n And patients have come to expect APM as an option, motivated, it might be supposed, by advertising which would have them believe that they are only one procedure away from returning to the tennis court or bike path.<\/p>\n Regrettably, some medical practices have been adopted as the result of misrepresented or falsified data.<\/p>\n One of the most egregious examples of collective medical mistake was the manner in which the medical community was manipulated into changing its perception of opioids in the 1990\u2019s. A sincere and overdue conversation about untreated pain by trusted thought leaders was hijacked by profiteers, with deadly results.<\/p>\n Until the 1980\u2019s, physicians had been particularly circumspect in their use of opioids for pain management, recognizing that the drugs posed a very real risk of addiction. As a result, the moderate to severe pain<\/a>experienced by at least one third of cancer patients was often poorly managed, if managed at all. In response to what it recognized as an international health problem, World Health Organization issued revised guidelines<\/a>for the management of cancer pain in 1986, opening the door for a new conversation about the use of opioids.<\/p>\n But the conversation was commandeered.<\/p>\n In The Tragedy of Needless Pain<\/a> published in Scientific American in February 1990, Ronald Melzack argued that morphine taken solely to control pain was not addictive, asserting that \u201cAddiction seems to arise in only some fraction of users who take the drug for its psychological effects.\u201d As evidence, he cited a \u201cstudy\u201d by Jane Porter and<\/p>\n Hershel Jick, M.D. published in the New England Journal of Medicine in which only four of 11,882 patients using narcotic drugs in a hospital setting became addicted.<\/p>\n In 1995, James Campbell, president of the American Pain Society, proposed<\/a> that pain be counted as the fifth vital sign. By 2001, the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO, now The Joint Commission) had added pain assessment for all patient visits as one of its standards.<\/p>\n The timing was nearly perfect for Purdue Pharma\u2019s introduction of Oxycontin, its patented Schedule II sustained-release oxycodone formulation in 1995.<\/p>\n Unlike other drugs in its category, Oxycontin only needed to be taken every 12 hours, not every four. But what really set it apart from its competitors was that Oxycontin debuted on the market with a unique label from the FDA reading, \u201cDelayed absorption as provided by Oxycontin tablets is believed to reduce the abuse liability of a drug<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n For physicians balancing new responsibilities for pain management against longstanding wariness of opioids, Oxycontin seemed the perfect solution. According to the Government Accountability Office, by 2003, \u201cnearly half of all OxyContin prescribers<\/a> were primary care physicians.\u201d<\/p>\n Regrettably, much of the data in which physicians had placed their trust wasn\u2019t true or had been incorrectly represented. The Porter Jick study<\/a> had been little more than a letter to the editor, not a randomized controlled trial.<\/p>\n The FDA had been misled in granting the special label, and Purdue Pharma had not shared feedback from clinicians and communities regarding the impact of the drug. According to the GAO, the drug\u2019s safety warning \u201cadvising patients not to crush the tablets because of the possible rapid release of a potentially toxic amount of oxycodone may have inadvertently alerted abusers to methods for abuse.\u201d<\/p>\n America\u2019s opioid epidemic has taken hundreds of thousands lives, shattered families and communities and is estimated to cost<\/a> over $1.5 trillion annually.<\/p>\n There is a growing movement to identify and eliminate ineffective medical treatments.<\/p>\n In January 2010, the New England Journal of Medicine published<\/a> a Perspective piece by Howard Brody, M.D., Ph.D., in which the bioethicist and physician argued that \u201cU.S. physicians could do a great deal to control costs if they were willing to practice more in accordance with evidence-based guidelines.\u201d<\/p>\n Brody called upon fellow clinicians to identify the top five diagnostic tests or treatments within each medical specialty which were \u201camong the most expensive services provided, and that have been shown by the currently available evidence not to provide any meaningful benefit to at least some major categories of patients for whom they are commonly ordered.\u201d<\/p>\n Meant to engage physicians in the effort to reduce healthcare costs, Brody\u2019s essay became the impetus for the National Internal Medicine Foundation\u2019s Choosing Wisely<\/a> initiative. The Choosing Wisely website offers advice for physicians and patients in identifying and choosing care that is evidence-based and cost effective.<\/p>\n Change can be difficult. And clinicians are not immune from the psychological discomfort of cognitive dissonance<\/a>, which can force individuals to double down on their beliefs when confronted with contradicting evidence.<\/p>\nWhen doctors know best<\/h3>\n
Patient expectations<\/h3>\n
Deliberate misrepresentation<\/h3>\n
Avoiding and eliminating ineffective treatments<\/h3>\n